BALANCING BETWEEN FEASIBILITY AND RELATIONSHIP.
INTERVENTIONS TO PREVENT DYSFUNCTIONALITY OF CONFLICT
IN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROJECTS.

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Abstract
Research shows that there are many bottle-necks in Public Private Partnership (PPP) Projects in Dutch spatial development. Due to the specific properties of Public Private Partnerships, these bottle-necks can lead to dysfunctional conflicts which are damaging the project. Hence the question is: how to prevent these conflicts?

Literature doesn’t answer this question on an operational level in the context of a PPP project in spatial development. So ten cases of PPP in spatial development are selected in which a conflict escalated in a way that the existence of the project was on the edge. The research strategy is to compare cases in a cooperative climate with cases in a competitive climate. Data are collected by interviewing representatives of the public side as well of the private side. Analyzing the data, several interventions are found. Analysis shows that in a cooperative climate a rich variety of interventions is used, while in a competitive climate the interventions are limited. The analysis also shows that in a competitive climate interventions are more focused on the relationship between the partners than on feasibility, while in a cooperative climate both aspects are equally attended.

Regardless of a cooperative or a competitive climate, the interventions found are concerning the feasibility of the project or the relation between actors. One moment it proves to be necessary to emphasize feasibility and the other moment the relationship. Therefore it is concluded that in spatial development dysfunctional conflicts in PPP projects can be prevented by balancing between feasibility and relationship. As such this research contributes to organizing collaboration.

Keywords: interventions, dysfunctionality, conflict, public private partnership, spatial development.

INTRODUCTION

Public Private Partnership in The Netherlands started a long time ago. ‘The Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), founded in march 1602, was already an example of Public Private Partnership in The Netherlands. The city of Amsterdam participated for more than 50 % in the risk-bearing capital of the VOC at the time of its foundation and the VOC was involved directly in the lay-out of the city.’ (Bult Spiering 2003: 8). Since then Public Private Partnership in The Netherlands has had from time to time many applications, e.g. in rebuilding the country after World War II, but it became regular after the use of the concept in the coalition agreement of the Dutch government in 1986. Two kinds of PPP in the
building industry evolved: projects with or without shared risk-bearing investments. An example of the first kind is an area development in which the price of the land to be paid to the public side is made dependent on the price of the real estate on it, to be paid by the market. An example of the second kind is in which the public side as a client drafts a contract with a private party about the Designing Building Financing Maintaining and sometimes also Operating, in short DBFM-O contracts, of e.g. a high way or a school building. Different from other countries as the UK, Germany, France or the USA, PPP projects with a shared risk-bearing investment has become a regularity in the Netherlands. The cause of this sometimes is located in institutional constraints. In the UK for example the public side is only by special allowance permitted to take part in Public Private Partnerships when it is possible that market-risks will be within the public realm and in the United States there is a stringent separation between Public and Private (Hobma, 2008: 7). Yet, still PPP projects with a shared financial risk appear in the UK as well is the USA, e.g. in joint venture projects as the Docklands in the UK and Baltimore or Portland in the USA (Bult-Spiering, 2008: 134-172). This article is only concerning PPP projects with shared risk-bearing investments; PPP projects in spatial development, where spatial development projects encloses projects in area development, infra structural projects and real estate projects. Because bottle neck research shows that the most and most intense bottle necks appear in the phases prior to the realization or construction contract (De Vries et al, 2003 en Dol et al, 2005, 2007), the case research at hand is limited to these phases.

FROM BOTTLE NECKS TO DYSFUNCTIONAL CONFLICTS

Research shows that many bottle-necks do occur in PPP projects in Dutch spatial development (Lousberg, 2009). Examples of these bottle-necks are:

• conflict of interest: public interest of quality versus private interest of profit (Spiering et al, 2001: 18);
• public decision making & procedures (Blanken et al, 2004: 41);
• in some practices, policy rhetoric instead of policy urgency is at hand (Van Rooy, 2009: 104-126, comp. Flyvbjerg et al, 2003).

A question is whether these bottle-necks can lead to dysfunctional conflicts.

What a conflict is or what a dysfunctional conflict is, is normative. It depends on what is considered as a problem. In this article a dysfunctional conflict is defined as a conflict in which, although parties involved want otherwise:

• no result is achieved that is shared and desired by all (compare Duke et al, 2004: 169);
• winning or losing becomes the key question (De Dreu, 2005: 77, 48);
• an unwanted delay or breaking up of the relationship occurs that is detrimental to the project.

Four indications of a relationship between bottle-necks and dysfunctional conflicts are found in literature.

First, due to sharing market risks, one of the most important properties of PPP projects in spatial development is uncertainty. In uncertain situations assumptions, defined as fact and values, play an important role and are affiliated closely with a belief that is emotionally
charged (Weick, 1995: 114). In an uncertain situation compared to a stable context there it is more likely that a conflict becomes social-emotional (Schuijer, 2007: 208, De Dreu, 2005:71, 72). Second, PPP projects in spatial development are ambiguous (Teisman, 2004: 14). By lack of objective criteria in ambiguous situations players with a different orientation on values rely on more personal or professional values while making sense of the situation. The clash of the different values often charges the situation politically and emotionally (Weick, 1995: 93).

Third, PPP-projects in spatial development are characterized by social diversity of public and private parties (Van der Meij et al, 2000:39, Bult-Spiering, 2003: 260, Karré et al, 2007: 192). Social diversity, defined as different in social terms: demographic properties, value systems determined by culture, religious convictions etc. enhance the possibility of social emotional conflict (De Dreu, 2005: 112, Pinto, 2004: 208).

Finally, in a business context social-emotional conflicts are dysfunctional (Robbins et al, 2010: 263).

These indications suggest that in the context of Public Private Partnerships in spatial development, bottle-necks can lead to dysfunctional conflicts which damage the project. Hence the question is: which interventions are used in practice to prevent dysfunctional conflict in PPP projects in spatial development?

IN SEARCH FOR INTERVENTIONS

Intervening is defined as one or a series of planned activities for change that are directed on increasing the effectiveness of an organization (De Caluwé et al, 2009); in this research interventions are defined as one or a series of planned activities on an operational level that in the interest of the project try to prevent a conflict becoming dysfunctional. In search for such interventions a rigorous and comprehensive literature study was conducted (Lousberg, 2009). Covering ground that has been covered many times before was expected. It did only partly. What was missing was a description of the interventions on an operational level specific in the context of a PPP project in spatial development. Time for a case study.

SELECTION OF THE CASES

The case study was conducted in 2009. Because of their expertise, more than 20 professionals were asked if they knew PPP cases in spatial development in which a conflict on feasibility escalated in such a way that the very existence of the project had been on the edge.

The earlier mentioned literature study indicated that in studying negotiations and conflict it is important to make a distinction between a competitive climate (group A) and a cooperative climate (group B) (compare Tjosvold, 1998). Comparing interventions in opposed conditions holds research findings more robust as far as a finding in one condition is not found in the other one (comp. Yin, 2003: 47). So the goal was to select cases with a cooperative climate as well as cases with a competitive climate.

A minimum of two to three cases in each group was required (Yin, 2003: 47) in order to make comparison between cases within a group possible (Yin, 2003: 51).
Twelve cases were recommended by experts after an extensive exploration, even after contacting relations of these experts no further cases were found. Out of these twelve, two cases were rejected; they didn’t match the requested profile. So ten cases were left. Using the criterion that the respondent from the public side should agree on the qualification of the climate with the respondent on the private side, one case was undefined, one appeared to have an average climate, two cases appeared to have a competitive climate and six a cooperative climate.

RESEARCH PHASES

The case study consists of three phases: Setting up the list of questions, Field work and Analysis.

Phase 1: Setting up the list of questions
The list of questions is structured in three parts:

- The first intended to check whether it is a suitable case;
- In the second part questions are as open as possible and broadly oriented in order to get the picture as complete as possible;
- The third part is directed in detail and made of closed questions.

Phase 2: Field work
In phase two the cases are examined by interviewing key role players:

- First in a number of telephone calls it was figured out who these key role players were;
- Next two, or in a single case three, interviews were conducted in order to gain insight in the circumstances under which the conflict threatened to become dysfunctional and to gain insight in what was done to prevent an escalation;
- Finally transcripts of the interviews were made. On the base of that case descriptions were made. These descriptions were send to the participants for approval.

Phase 3: Analysis
The analysis of the response to the control questions consisted of checking the response on the requirement that this was a case of PPP in spatial development in which a conflict on feasibility escalated in a way that the existence of the project was on the edge.

Analysis of the response to the open questions was focused on essences and not on patterns in or relations between concepts that were used in the answer. Therefore a method was used that consisted of tracing the essences in the answers by underlining text fragments, summarize these and interpret this summary on used interventions. As indicated before an intervention is defined as one or a series of activities on an operational level that in the interest of the project try to prevent a conflict becoming dysfunctional.

The analysis of the response to the closed questions consisted of qualification in terms of Yes, No, +, +/- and -. 
The research strategy was to compare cases, so a cross case analysis was conducted. This cross case analysis was based on the data of a single case analysis. The single case analysis is described first.

Because of the limited number of pages of this article, only two out of the ten cases are presented here. They represent two extremes in the spectrum of possible climates: one case in a competitive climate and one case in a cooperative climate.

**SINGLE CASE ANALYSIS**

The response to the control questions in the first part of the interviews confirms that the cases match the requested profile. The response to the second part of the interviews is presented below. The answers to the third part of the interviews, the closed questions, will be attended in the cross case analysis next to this single case analysis.

**The case in a competitive climate**

*Project and Public Private Partnership*

A mid-sized municipality in the Netherlands decides in the nineties to transform the existing center into a modern center attractive to inhabitants of the city and the region. Goal is to unite two areas that are divided by urban barriers. The municipality organizes a competition that is won by a project developer. The first phase of the project requires 150 million euro’s on investment. The case is restricted to the period prior to the moment of the actual development agreement, early 2000.

Together with relevant parties, including the developer and the investor, the municipality commissioned an architect to design a plan. This plan not only included urban, financial and legal affairs but also the way in which all parties cooperate. At the end of the project the bill will be settled with money left over from subtracting costs from revenues paid by the market. No PPP legal entity is at hand, but a PPP wherein public revenues on land are dependent of private revenues on selling real estate on this land.

*Heart of the conflict and escalation*

The municipality: ‘It went wrong in the phase that we had to agree based on a base amount. And we didn’t agree on this base amount(-). Originally it were some millions, but in the end it was two hundred thousand euro’s.’ The developer noticed: ‘Two hundred thousand euro’s, you can call that no conflict. But it was a kind of escalation of a long lasting mutual irritation’.

De developer continues on how the conflict escalated: ’It was a kind of escalation of a very long process in which we felt: “Guys, this is the limit, it’s not possible any more, the project won’t last any longer”. And a municipality that continued to say: “And this has to be added, and that has to be added, and those have also to be added”, anyway that was our perspective. So finally we visited that restaurant, were it escalated. I’ve never been so angry in my career! A special moment anyway…”.

The municipality: ‘We went with a complete delegation from here to eat elsewhere and that didn’t work: we didn’t succeeded in any way. Of course we had informed our alderman extensively, but he interpreted it all much to literally. His stake was: “They won’t get these
two hundred thousand euro’s!” and he really went to sit on it; he said: “You are really delivering these two hundred thousand, or the cooperation is over!” Yeah, really, it almost went out of control. Finally it was “If you don’t call me tomorrow morning before half past eight and agree, you will be kicked out!”.

Analysis of the response to the open questions
Besides general questions about the project and the conflict, four open questions were asked:

1. What was the climate for cooperation over time and how was this created?
2. What actions took place in the realm of feasibility?
3. What actions took place in the realm of the relationship?
4. What actions were taken in order to proceed successfully?

In the tables below in the first column it is indicated whether a response is given by the Municipality (M) or the Developer (D). In the second column the response to the questions is presented, the essences are shown in italics. In the third column these essences are summarized and, if possible, interpreted as interventions. Interventions are defined as one or a series of activities on an operational level that in the interest of the project try to prevent a dysfunctional conflict (compare De Caluwé et al, 2009).

To make the summary retraceable, it is placed directly beside the essences in italics. In the summary interventions are shown in bold.

The table with the response on the open questions is followed by a table with the response on the closed questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 1: What was the climate for cooperation over time and how was this created?</th>
<th>Summarized and interpreted</th>
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</table>
| **M** ‘Difficult’ (-) It’s totally not, it’s not filled with hatred. But it is sometimes like “Come on, it really annoys me now. I’ve given you all the arguments that I can think of why I am right and so why you are really wrong”, well at that moment sometimes you get irritations’. And on how this was created: ‘With some developers you agree within a couple of months and that means that you don’t diverge much of what you have estimated. With other developers it’s not the same. My lifelong experience with this developer, also from my earlier period, is quite simple: it goes on and on and on. According to me it has to do something with the instructions the project staff receives: “Get the most out of it”.

Tending to competitive by endless efforts to get the utmost out of it | |
| **D** ‘We had, as we experienced it, a difficult relationship with the municipality. We never had a real ambition together for the plan (-). No, it wasn’t easy.’ And on how this was created: ‘We came closer and closer to that 26 [the deficit]. Always in very tiny steps. And that gave me with this boss very much the feeling of “how can I turn the ship”. Sometimes one has also a feeling of lack of power, of not performing well. We didn’t have something in common, in a sense of: “Let’s do a project together”.

Doubtful by a lack of shared ambition | |
### Question 2: What actions took place in the realm of feasibility?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M</th>
<th>‘We always start with a land development sheet. There we fill in the numbers on the revenue side. We then thus hear that this is way too high. All the parameters that are in there, they are all subject of negotiation. But then in the end on the base of the design, the cost side dominates.’</th>
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<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>‘It went very much into detail. It went along with a large mutual distrust. We often said: “This cost about this and this cost about that and then it’s ok” but the municipality they went to sort it out, all details. This fed also a little bit the distrust of the municipality as a kind of “They take it all too easy”.’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mutual distrust fed by nonchalance on costs.</td>
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### Question 3: What actions took place in the realm of the relationship?

| M | ‘I’ve always learned one thing: (-) if you just talk on a relaxed level, things really go well. And that needs organizing a climate and that, also with this alderman, and that absolutely doesn’t always have to be a negotiation. It’s much more fun to get together once in a while. There must evolve a certain relation and trust between people and hence everyone that’s sitting there has a certain responsibility to arrange things in a way that what we do agree on. Only, what you see with developers is that this level between the operational and policy or management part, that it’s unbelievable how far these levels do diverge. On a certain level beautiful deals are made and the people that are under it, it’s their cup of tea to execute it. But they get targets…you’ll get sick of. That’s something that’s never discussed up there, really, but anyhow, it’s not possible to exclude that a war is going on here. It’s really always the interaction between people that determines whether it’s going to work or it is damned to die.’ |
| D | ‘Not’ |

### Question 4: What actions were taken in order to proceed succesfully?

| M | ‘Meeting off side. In the official meeting it’s tough, and then you think: “this is not getting us anywhere”. Next you just take them apart and try to give the other party insight in: “If we stay as stubborn as we are now, the cooperation will be over”.’ And specifically on the conflict: ‘So what happens the next day [after the conflict in the restaurant] before half past eight, or around half past eight, the developer called: ”Ok, we do agree’.” |
| D | ‘Honestly I think that we didn’t manage the relationship with the municipality at all. We have more looked outside the municipality in order to get things right, than to improve the relationship with the municipality. I might admit.’ |

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Summarized and interpreted:

- Factors that determine the revenues are negotiable. Discussion finally focuses on the cost side.
- Mutual distrust fed by nonchalance on costs.
- Informal contact is needed to generate trust.
- The level of trust differs per level of position due to targets.
- Working together as a critical factor of success.
- In general: Informal contact.
- During the conflict: Give in.
The case in a cooperative climate

Project and Public Private Partnership

The case is the development of an area of a big city in the Netherlands. It’s about 650 houses with an estimated investment of 200 million euro’s. The private parties were involved through an European tender during the nineties. Finally two developers joined together, an investor and a housing association represented by one project executive: the Developer. The public side is also represented by a project executive; in the following indicated as the Municipality. The case itself is around 2005/2006, in the final stage of contract negotiations.

How risks were divided among themselves is reflected in the following quote: ‘It’s rather simple, normally we say: we deliver the prepared land, we equip the public area and take care of the legal and urban procedures. And they take care of the realization of the houses according to specifications that we agreed on. You design an urban plan, we made it together, but it is up to him to really meet the urban profiles of the that we agreed on. Also the number and the categories of houses that we agreed on. These are mainly houses, so normally a municipality has a certain system that means that the price for the land is what is left in the end after selling the houses and other buildings. Here it is different, we did it normatively. We say, yes, of course you can pump up the building costs as much as you want, but this is the price we need for the land. Because we know what happens, otherwise calculations will be so expensive that no price for the land is left.’ Just as in the former case, in this PPP there is no legal entity for the project wherein risks and revenues are taken public as well as private, but there is a PPP in which public revenues finally are dependent on private revenues.

Escalation and heart of the conflict

The municipality on how the conflict almost escalated: ‘The first phase was when the developer was just indoors and immediately started about the price for the land. He immediately started a discussion about the senselessness of the way that we calculate this price for the land. I said “we do it in our own way” and he said “that’s nonsense, you really have to do it non-normative, you really don’t understand how it works”...well, that’s not a sensible remark in the beginning.’

According to the developer the heart of the conflict was in: ‘We were stuck. We say we are waiting for the non-normative price, they say normative. They say the revenues must be that much, we say it’s impossible. They say it has to be like this, we say it has to be different.’ And according to the municipality: ‘Well, the heart of the conflict was that we estimated their possibility for profit much higher than they did and that they on the other side of course estimated our costs far too low.’

Analysis of the response to the open questions

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Question 1: What was the climate for cooperation over time and how was this created?</th>
<th>Summarized and interpreted</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong> ‘It was cooperative (-) There are a few things you can’t exactly describe, it’s about chemistry between people, that was part of it. Once I had to attend a meeting somewhere in Rotterdam en the developer,</td>
<td>Cooperative by chemistry between people and by</td>
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He lived in Rotterdam. When he heard that I had to go to Rotterdam and that I had my return trip arranged, but not getting there…well, he said “we drive together then and eat something en route”. *Than the conversation is about other things…you don’t talk immediately about your work.* That was a very important moment, …if you only talk to them during meetings, things go wrong. (-) On the other hand…the municipality is under magnifying glasses; it’s of course *not possible to make hole-and-corner arrangements.* That’s the other side, but what I sometimes observe is that people keep distance out of fear, that occurs. I’m not going to eat with a developer, that’s nonsense. The only thing I can do is to pay my own bill. It’s that simple’.

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<tr>
<th>D</th>
<th>‘Well, very nice(-) We’ve had our moments, if I’m honest, but finally it proves to be that the will to do it together, that settles it. The climate was influenced at that time by the will of both sides to be successful and after that moment the climate was also very cooperative. A very positive mutual respect evolved and understanding of each other interests (-) The representative of the municipality had of course his political bosses and I had my bosses; that gave a strong relation, as in: “I’ll get by to drink a cup of coffee or when we had a meeting. I’ll get by half an hour earlier, is that possible...” and then also say “but when I do this I’m in that much trouble…that I won’t do”, but the representative of the municipality also said: “Yes, I’m stuck here with politics and I do understand that we can’t go any faster, but what can we do next?” What matters is that you create understanding with the other party for the problems that you have and vice versa.’</th>
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**Question 2:** What actions took place in the realm of feasibility?  
M ‘Working on feasibility was making transparent the cost side to the municipality and to give the other party insight into that and offering them the opportunity to do it cheaper as a matter of fact.’  
Discussion focuses on the cost side and the back grounds of it

| D | ‘We negotiated the price of the land of course. I went through calculations again and again and I thought…the municipality is exaggerating immensely’ |

**Question 3:** What actions took place in the realm of the relationship?  
M ‘You can’t sincerely work together if the personal relationship is poor. What is convenient for later negotiations, is that the business side is connected with the personal side. So the art is to do this business side as sharp as possible without a nasty way of talking getting the upper hand. So you build a relationship in order to make a shared plan. That’s what I mean with the social side…practical things…you have to visit together things, preparation of the project…when you A good relationship as pre condition for cooperation, connecting the business side with the personal, negotiate on the edge in a friendly way and work together on a shared plan.  
Building a relationship by Co operation
O ‘By talking, by understanding what their problem is and what we can do…so by creating a common ground…by creating a shared problem. So we have searched very consciously in order to find a solution. What we have orientated on is to keep our relationship balanced, it’s also a part of peoples characters, I suppose. As a matter of fact we appreciated each other very much in the role we had, so we did understand each other.

By understanding the problem of the other party as **Creating a shared problem and solve it.**

Next keeping relationship balanced. Appreciation of each other’s role as pre condition for understanding

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**Question 4. What actions were taken in order to proceed successfully?**

**Summarized and interpreted**

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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>‘If you have a difference in price as large as we had….with a difference of 10 million on a sum of 37, that’s rather dramatic…what you do once again is to explore things in a totally different way…you investigate what else you can come up with…because these 37 million that we asked as the price for the land, were equal to our costs in his case. So my proposition was…as a municipality we are not going to lose on this one, as simple as that…this is the end. And in a way this was reasonable. They didn’t think so and a discussion emerged: “Yes, but we have done also some calculations and we think that 37 million is an awful lot of money”. Municipalities usually don’t give any insight in their calculations. We said “If you can do it for less…it’s negotiable”. Then they recalculated everything and said: “we think that we can do it for 27 million and then we are even”.’</td>
<td>During conflict:</td>
<td>Confrontation and Exploration</td>
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<td>BAWA - Best Alternative Without an Agreement (Fisher et al, 2004: 123)</td>
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<td>Offering an alternative</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>‘I said to my colleague: “If it’s up to me we are going to tell them tomorrow that we take over, that we take the risk. We have looked very well into it and we want to help you by taking over the risk of developing the land”.’</td>
<td>During conflict:</td>
<td>Taking over the risk of the other party</td>
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**CROSS CASE ANALYSIS**

Above, two examples were given of how the ten cases were analyzed. In analyzing the ten cases several interventions were traced. Cross case analysis started with making an inventory of the interventions that took place in a cooperative climate next to interventions in a competitive climate and labeling the interventions as concerning feasibility or the relationship, see figure 1.
Figure 1: *aced in the case study.*

The figure shows that in a cooperative climate a rich variety of interventions is used, while in a competitive climate the interventions are limited.

It is remarkable that, contrary to a cooperative climate, in the competitive climate only one intervention is found concerning feasibility, namely Confrontation of differences in perception, and several concerning the relationship, namely Informal contact and Threatening, Giving in, Intervening ‘from above’ and Removing. In a competitive climate attention seems to be more directed towards relationship than feasibility.

So, analysis shows that in a competitive climate interventions are more focused on the relationship between the partners than on feasibility, while in a cooperative climate both aspects are equally attended.

Next, the interventions will be described by examples as found in the case study.

**Interventions in a cooperative climate**

The figure shows that in a cooperative climate intervening in feasibility contributes to preventing a dysfunctional conflict by:

- Taking risk measures such as converting an investment that is depending on revenues to a guaranteed investment or by taking over the risk from the other party;
- Adjustment of the quality or quantity of the plan such as transforming it to other functions or adjusting the number of houses;
- Working on the revenues and the cash flow such as increasing the quality of the houses in favor of the revenues or speeding up the cash flow because of reduction of the cost of interest;
- Prior to the negotiations determining a Best Alternative Without an Agreement (BAWA) (Fisher, 2004: 123) such as cancelling the project if no agreement is
reached;
• Offering alternatives as taking over preparing the land from the other party;
• Relocating costs as cut backs or increasing the price of the land.
In short: by (T)aking measures concerning content (see the figure).

Further Confronting Retrieving and Exploring of differences in perception on feasibility (CRE) proves to be contributing to the prevention of a dysfunctional conflict.

Intervening in the relationship also proves to be contributing to the prevention of a dysfunctional conflict in a cooperative climate by:
• Having informal contact prior to a meeting in order to elaborate on political back grounds of points of view or to brain storm about possible solutions;
• Cooperation such as making a shared problem statement or sketching a plan together;
• If it appears to be necessary: removing a party that undermines the cooperation by reasoning solely from his own interest;
• Threatening such as threatening with the possibility that if negotiations fail the whole project will be taken over or threatening with negative publicity.
• Intervening ‘from above’ such as convincing a minister to make a telephone call to the CEO of the other party;
• Giving in as a way of investing in the continuance of the relationship in the future;
• Taking a Time out in order to give the parties involved a chance to reconsider;
• Involving a third party when negotiations have reached a deadlock such as a mediator or not deciding by yourself but letting your backing decide;
• In case of an unbalance in power giving one of the parties more or less power in order to restore the balance.
In short: by (P)ositioning.

Finally in a cooperative climate it proves to be that preventing a dysfunctional conflict coincides with private conversations, calling at the end of the day in order to coordinate and tune fine, prior to negotiations meet informal, call sometimes in between hours to test ideas, sitting apart for a minute or celebrating mile stones together; in short: by managing the relationship (I)nformal.

**Interventions in a competitive climate**

In a competitive climate regarding the intervention Confronting Retrieving and Exploring of differences in perception on feasibility (CRE) only the (C)onfrontation of differences in perception takes place, no Retrieving of back grounds or Exploration.

Concerning the relation in a competitive climate partly the same interventions as in a cooperative climate occur, namely Informal contact, Threatening, Giving in and Intervening ‘from above’, all part of (P)ositioning.

**CONCLUSION**

The research question for this case study was: which interventions are used in practice to prevent dysfunctional conflict in PPP projects in spatial development?
Analysis shows that in practice the interventions (T)aking measures concerning content, Confronting Retrieving and Exploring of differences in perception of feasibility (CRE), (P)ositioning and managing the relationship (I)informal contribute to the prevention of dysfunctional conflicts. Further, the prevention of a dysfunctional conflict cannot exclusively be related to a cooperative climate, but in a competitive climate the interventions (C)onfronting differences in perception on feasibility and (P)ositioning can also prevent dysfunctional conflicts.

Regardless of a cooperative or a competitive climate, the interventions found are concerning the feasibility of the project or the relation between actors. One moment it proves to be necessary to emphasize feasibility and the other moment the relationship. Therefore it is concluded that in spatial development dysfunctional conflicts in PPP projects can be prevented by balancing between feasibility and relationship. As such it contributes to organizing collaboration.

**LITERATURE**


